


USAF COUNTERPROLIFERATION CENTER

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Experts study anti-bioterror caches

At private meeting, officials to discuss how to improve stockpiles

Associated Press

Originally published January 14, 2002

WASHINGTON - In warehouses hidden across the nation are tons of pills for anthrax and radiation and vaccine for smallpox - but the nation's anti-terrorism stockpile is far from complete.

Next month, in a closed-door meeting in Atlanta, FBI and other intelligence agents will meet with physician experts on germ and chemical warfare and radiation to figure out what therapies should be bought next.

On the table are experimental treatments for hemorrhagic fevers and smallpox, the proper supply of antitoxin for botulism and a new cyanide antidote that may replace one some experts call antiquated.

And while the stockpile has lots of antibiotics that prevent anthrax infection, it doesn't include some drugs that may be key to treating an already sick person.

"Everything is up for grabs," said Steven Bice, who runs the National Pharmaceutical Stockpile. "We'll review our entire formulary."

Most Americans had never heard of the federal stockpile until the fall anthrax attacks. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention started it in 1999, spending \$150 million over the next three years quietly purchasing antidotes - fortunately, starting with antibiotics that can fend off anthrax. Those drugs were a good buy: Many also can treat plague and tularemia, other potential bioterror agents.

When anthrax struck, the government swiftly spent more than half a billion dollars pumping up the stockpile, adding 100 million more doses of anthrax-fighting Cipro and seeking enough smallpox vaccine for every American. The latest buy: millions of potassium iodide tablets, used to prevent thyroid cancer after release of radioactive iodine.

Now the big question is what to buy next.

CDC won't release an entire list of the stockpile's contents, citing security. Likewise, next month's meeting between intelligence officials and CDC-picked physicians on which pathogens top the threat list is closed to the public.

But some options will generate serious debate.

Take anthrax. The stockpile has lots of the Cipro and doxycycline pills that were taken by thousands of people who were exposed during the attacks-by-mail. But treatment once someone is sick requires additional drugs, to fight anthrax-caused meningitis and the protein synthesis crucial to the germ's lethality. While the stockpile contains stronger intravenous Cipro, CDC isn't sure which other drugs are best to prescribe with it and need to be stockpiled. Candidates include clindamycin, Rifampin and vancomycin.

"I'd like to see a little more definitive research" before choosing, said CDC anthrax expert Dr. Bradley Perkins.

Also on tap for next month's meeting:

How to handle hemorrhagic diseases such as the Ebola virus or Lassa fever. No proven treatments exist, although the hepatitis drug ribavirin is sometimes tried.

"But you need an intravenous drug, which is not yet licensed in the U.S. and is available only in short supply," said Dr. C.J. Peters of the University of Texas, Galveston, a former top CDC official pushing to stockpile IV ribavirin.

How much botulism antitoxin is needed? The CDC has a contract with Aventis Pasteur to make several hundred doses, not just for bioterrorism but for cases of natural - usually food-borne - botulism. The military also has a small antitoxin supply.

France houses the world's biggest antitoxin cache and some experts favor negotiating for overseas shipments, Bice said. But "we're working not to be dependent upon that."

<http://www.baltimoresun.com/bal-te.stockpiles14jan14.story>

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CDC says anthrax risk diminishing in the US

AP [SUNDAY, JANUARY 13, 2002 8:57:30 PM]

WASHINGTON: The head of the federal Centers for Disease Control and Prevention told postal workers Friday that medical experts are providing their best advice on anthrax, but the disease isn't well enough understood to tell people for sure what to do.

"There have been lots of unanswered questions," Dr Jeffrey P. Koplan told a meeting of the American Postal Workers Union.

"We've learned a lot" since the anthrax-by-mail attacks last fall, he said, including that some of the answers they had before the attacks were wrong.

Decisions have to be made every day, Koplan said, and CDC experts were forced to offer their best guidance without waiting for years of testing and research.

In that situation, after more has been learned, invariably someone will come along and say "you were stupid and you were wrong," Koplan said. "I think we have done more good than harm."

The anthrax attacks have also been a sharp learning experience for the Labor Department, according to John L. Henshaw, assistant secretary of labor for occupational safety and health.

"None of us expected bioterrorism in the workplace and we weren't prepared," he said.

Postal workers were especially concerned about seemingly conflicting advice given to them after many took antibiotics for 60 days following exposure to anthrax in Washington, New Jersey and elsewhere.

Five people have died of anthrax, including two postal workers, and 13 others have become ill but recovered.

When postal workers finished their first 60 days of antibiotics, CDC experts suggested they could continue on those drugs, add vaccinations, or end treatment. Most opted to avoid the vaccine and District of Columbia health officials discouraged them from taking the shots.

Koplan said he didn't see that as a disagreement, suggesting that after looking at the pros and cons people could simply come to different conclusions.

Asked by workers what he would have done in their case, Koplan said he "would not hesitate to take the vaccine" if he had had a significant exposure to the disease.

"But," he admitted, "if I were in your shoes and had taken 60 days of antibiotics and felt lousy from it, my answer might not be the same."

While that didn't answer all the questions posed by postal workers, it at least eased the concerns of one.

John Ford, a union member who worked at Washington's contaminated Brentwood facility, said he had worried that medical officials were withholding information.

"Now I realize they don't know the answers, period," Ford said.

APWU member Jim Burke, who has been active in getting anthrax contamination cleaned up in New Jersey, said this has been the most frustrating five months in his 40 years of work because of the lack of solid knowledge of the disease and how to cope with it.

Koplan did tell the workers that the longer people exposed to anthrax remain symptom-free, the more likely it is that they won't get the disease. But there is no set day the risk is ended, he said.

"With each passing day away from exposure ... you can feel more comfortable that the risk is diminished," Koplan said.

The risk varies from person to person depending on how much of the disease they were exposed to.

Experts had originally thought it takes thousands of spores to cause the inhaled form of the disease, Koplan said. Now they know that may be wrong, but still don't know how much exposure is needed for the disease to develop.

The next problem is making sure contaminated buildings are safe and Koplan said officials do not know what a safe level of exposure may be.

There are parts of the country where anthrax occurs naturally and people don't get sick, he noted.

So when it comes to a building in which anthrax spores have been released, "how clean is clean enough?" he was asked. "We'll come up with an answer," he said, "but it'll be a relative one."

http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/articleshow.asp?art_id=1586301042

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U.N. inspectors at arm's length Monitoring team can only sit, wait for entry into Iraq

By Mark Matthews

Sun National Staff

Originally published January 13, 2002

WASHINGTON - Thirty-one floors above New York's East River, Hans Blix sits atop a United Nations agency with a skilled staff, plenty of money, a clear mission - and virtually nothing to do.

Blix heads the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC), created in 1999 to rid Iraq of weapons of mass destruction and set up a system to prevent Baghdad from reacquiring them. For the past two years, he has striven to put together the most professional, best-prepared arms-inspection apparatus possible.

But Saddam Hussein, defying a warning from President Bush, refuses to allow the inspectors into Iraq. So all Blix can do is wait.

"I would have liked to be finished by now," he said last week in Washington.

UNMOVIC embodies all the contradictory impulses in the United Nations' - and the United States' - 11-year confrontation with Iraq: toughness and determination backed by military force, alternating with attempts to appease Baghdad and placate its supporters on the U.N. Security Council.

The first U.N. arms agency set up to monitor Iraq, called the Special Commission, or UNSCOM, disintegrated in 1999, eight years after it was formed in the wake of the Persian Gulf war.

Hussein expelled its inspectors in late 1998. Then the Security Council consensus supporting the inspection system crumbled. Russia, eyeing its future relations with Iraq, turned against the agency's top leadership, accusing it of cowboy antics and of working for the United States. At times, France and China joined in the criticism.

UNMOVIC was formed as part of a new U.N. approach to Baghdad. Instead of having to come completely clean on its nuclear, chemical, biological and missile programs before breaking free of sanctions, Iraq can win a temporary

lifting of sanctions if it "cooperates fully" with the inspections.

Unlike UNSCOM, the new agency's staff members are hired and paid by the United Nations, not lent by the major powers, to avoid the appearance of dual loyalty.

"We are getting a greater international mix, more of a normal U.N. composition. This is the world that is engaged," Blix said.

UNMOVIC's funding comes from a portion of Iraqi oil revenue under U.N. control.

The choice of leader reflects a new style. UNSCOM's last executive chairman, the blunt-spoken Australian Richard Butler, confronted Iraq repeatedly in public, making skillful use of the world's media, and his inspectors drew charges of being highhanded and insulting toward Iraqis.

Blix, 73, a former high-ranking Swedish diplomat who directed the U.N. International Atomic Energy Agency for 16 years, is so soft-spoken and mild-mannered that he comes across as a kindly grandfather.

He has instructed his inspectors to be "firm, demanding, but correct. We're not there to insult or provoke," he says.

"We have to remember that inspectors are not an occupying army," he said in an interview. "We are not international police."

He says he will avoid one of the UNSCOM tactics that enraged the Iraqis - attempts to trigger Iraqi reactions that would expose ways in which Baghdad concealed its prohibited-weapons programs.

"We have not pronounced any intention to look for a mechanism of concealment," Blix said. "We'd rather go for the prohibited items than the procedures."

Apart from tactics, Blix insisted that fundamentally, UNMOVIC, working with the IAEA, has the same hardheaded purpose spelled out in U.N. resolutions after the gulf war: discovering whether Iraq continues to possess or develop nuclear, chemical or biological weapons and missiles that could reach neighboring countries. This is not UNSCOM-lite, he insists.

Inspectors will insist on being able to look wherever and whenever they want and demand that Iraqi authorities ensure their protection, he said.

"If we get a tip that there might be something hidden somewhere, then we'll go for it," he said. "If they do not cooperate, if they deny access, denial itself is a signal" of a refusal to cooperate, presumably because Iraq has something to hide.

Still, a cloud hangs over Blix and UNMOVIC stemming from Blix's tenure as head of the IAEA. Despite years of inspections and safeguards aimed at preventing proliferation of nuclear weapons, the agency failed to discover that Iraq was steadily trying to develop nuclear weapons.

There was at least one important clue along the way. In March 1990, Britain conducted a sting operation that uncovered an Iraqi plan to import krytrons, a triggering device for nuclear weapons.

"I asked the Iraqi ambassador, 'What is this?' And he assured me that 'Well, you know, these are fast switches and they are for the University of Baghdad, and if you want to, we can arrange to have the invoices here and tell you what they are for,'" Blix recalled. Asked if he had followed up, Blix said, "No, we did not follow up on that.

"The British must have had suspicions. But as far as I'm aware and have learned, none of the intelligence agencies were aware of the installations" where Iraq was working to enrich uranium for nuclear bombs, he said.

Learning from 'calamity'

Blix said he and the IAEA "learned a lot from that calamity." Safeguards were strengthened, and the agency resolved to report only what it could absolutely verify and not be lulled into a false sense of security.

But the episode continues to reverberate in Washington, where skeptics wonder if Blix can be any match for the determined Iraqis.

"He's a nice man. I don't think he's particularly tough or resilient," said Richard Perle, an outside adviser to the Pentagon and a leading voice in calling for a military campaign to end Saddam Hussein's regime.

Perle is among those who argue that even the most dogged inspection agency could not remove the dangerous threat posed by Iraq. For now, however, a push for inspections is a keystone of the administration's strategy.

Bush warned last month that if Saddam Hussein doesn't allow UNMOVIC in, "he'll find out" about the consequences.

Right now, "the focus is on Afghanistan. That's quite clear," said Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage. But he added, "We're going to have to deal with Iraq - it's unfinished business - but at a time, place and manner of the president's choosing. Either they will let the inspectors in, or they won't, and there will be future consequences."

By the time the last inspectors left in 1998, they couldn't say with certainty that Iraq had abandoned any of its dangerous weapons programs; they believed that they knew least about its stockpile of germ-warfare agents.

Charles Duelfer, the No. 2 official at UNSCOM, says Iraq might begin diplomatic moves to allow inspectors back in as a way of forestalling threatened military action or breaking out of its international isolation.

"It offers Iraq an opportunity to wrap a rope around our propeller if we want to do something," he said. If allowed in, he predicts, "Blix is going to have a tough job getting in with freedom of action."

Looking ahead to June

While Blix waits, he and his staff are planning their first project in Iraq: investigating what the regime might have done during the past three years to advance its weapons programs.

Meanwhile, they look forward to June, when they will at last be able to undertake a small part of their mission.

The Security Council expects in June to approve a list of what Iraq can and cannot import under new, loosened economic sanctions. UNMOVIC can turn questionable contracts for imports that might be used militarily over to the Security Council for review.

Blix says he looks forward to pursuing UNMOVIC's real challenge, understanding that "the reality is still a very bloody one, a very serious one."

<http://sunspot.net/news/nationworld/bal-te.iraq13jan13.story?coll=bal%2Dnews%2Dnation>

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Moscow Times
January 15, 2002
Pg. 4

U.S., Russia Discuss Nuclear Cuts

By Charles Aldinger, Reuters

WASHINGTON -- Senior U.S. and Russian defense officials meet Tuesday to begin planning joint deep cuts in nuclear arms and discuss Moscow's objections to U.S. plans to store unused warheads instead of destroying them. Defense Undersecretary Douglas Feith will hold two days of talks at the Pentagon with a team headed by the first deputy of the General Staff, Colonel-General Yuri Baluyevsky.

Both countries have pledged to reduce by about two-thirds their deployed strategic nuclear arsenals of more than 6,000 warheads each over the coming decade. But the Pentagon said last week that some U.S. arms would be shelved for possible emergency redeployment.

The Foreign Ministry quickly urged Washington to fulfill pledges to proceed with real cuts, saying, "That means strategic nuclear weapons must be cut not only 'on paper.'"

But a senior U.S. diplomat expressed confidence to reporters that a deal would be reached with Russia that could quell any fears about the U.S. plans.

"The Russians have fired their opening salvo on the issue but I think we'll be able to wrestle it to the ground," the diplomat told reporters Friday, speaking on condition of anonymity.

Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld and Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov agreed in Brussels last month to begin planning in January on when and how to begin cuts promised by their presidents, including "predictability and accountability" on the cuts. U.S. President George W. Bush is expected to visit Russia at midyear for talks with President Vladimir Putin on the growing strategic, political and financial ties between the two former Cold War enemies.

Bush has vowed to cut the deployed U.S. arsenal to between 1,700 and 2,200 warheads, while Putin has said he plans cuts to between 1,500 and 2,200.

"The forthcoming Russian-U.S. consultations will focus on the drafting of a strategic offensive arms agreement," Baluyevsky said Sunday, Itar-Tass reported.

Baluyevsky said the agreement would be drafted by summer and that parameters of future strategic offensive arms reductions and verification mechanisms would be the main components.

Itar-Tass quoted military and diplomatic sources in Moscow as saying Russia and the United States would hold another round of strategic offensive arms consultations in late January. The Russian delegation would be led by Deputy Foreign Minister Georgy Mamedov.

In Washington, the senior U.S. official said Friday that the two sides would look at additional inspections for storage sites and data exchange to keep accurate track of weapons held in storage.

"The Russians may well propose some numerical cap, either through an absolute or a percentage, and that is something we will have to consider," he said. "We're thinking very much in terms of threats from other quarters than Russia ... and while advances in conventional weaponry are giving us alternatives to nuclear deterrence, in some scenarios we still think nuclear deterrence has a role to play."

The U.S. plan for a missile defense costing billions of dollars has dominated negotiations on arms reductions that began after the Soviet Union broke up.

Baluyevsky said missile defense and Bush's announcement that the United States would withdraw from the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty this year would also be on the agenda for this week's talks.

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New York Times
January 15, 2002

Vaccine Supplier Cleared

LANSING, Mich., Jan. 14 (AP) — After a four-year wait, the nation's sole maker of the anthrax vaccine has met federal production requirements and is on the verge of resuming shipments to the Pentagon.

The company, BioPort Corporation of Lansing, received a Dec. 27 letter from the Food and Drug Administration clearing it to begin shipping, provided a laboratory in Washington State that packages the vaccine also receives F.D.A. approval.

The vaccine itself also must be tested by BioPort for purity, potency and sterility and be released by the F.D.A. Shipments could begin later this month.

Military vaccinations nearly halted because of low supplies after the laboratory failed inspections.

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Washingtonpost.com

January 14, 2002

Dot.mil

Another Rumsfeld Bomb

By William M. Arkin, Special to washingtonpost.com

The Pentagon's "Nuclear Posture Review," released last Thursday, is getting good ink in the offline media. The plan to reduce U.S. strategic nuclear forces from the current 6,000 warheads to 3,800 by 2007, and 1,700-2,200 by 2012 makes sense and has been widely praised. Less noticed, however, are other decisions in the review that have the potential to irritate the global nuclear situation and create greater dangers for the United States.

This isn't to damn Bush by comparison with his predecessor. Bill Clinton took no courageous stances on nuclear reductions nor did he take advantage of the end of the Cold War to change the nuclear landscape in any fundamental way.

In fact, there is plenty of continuity between the new Bush review and one done by its predecessor in 1994. Then the Clinton administration stated that "U.S. forces must be prepared to deter, prevent and defend against" states that possess weapons of mass destruction. Now Bush pledges to "dissuade, deter, and defeat" them.

Clinton's review said, "It is necessary for us to maintain a hedge to return to a more robust nuclear posture should that be necessary." These days the hedge is called the "responsive force."

But the changes reflect something deeper than semantics.

Nuclear Drift

The Nuclear Posture Review, known in the trade as the NPR, has been eagerly awaited since George Bush took office. In 2000 candidate Bush promised deep reductions in nuclear warheads. Once in power, his administration started to back away from U.S. treaty obligations relating to missile defenses, nuclear testing, and strategic arms reductions.

The arms control community has been in its usual state of jitters. There is criticism of Bush's abandonment of the anti-ballistic missile (ABM) treaty. There is worry about the administration's on-again-off-again support for securing Russia's nuclear warheads and material. Others fret about a drift towards renewed nuclear testing. Some sense the administrative might be receptive to hawkish proposals that the U.S. use nuclear weapons in response to chemical or biological warfare attack. Others fear the administration is contemplating developing nuclear weapons to attack targets too deeply buried to be reached any other way. But to be fair to the current administration, Clinton's nuclear drift was moving the United States in these directions anyhow.

Moreover, the Bush team deserves credit for some things. Rumsfeld should be applauded for promising to abandon the decades-old policy of "mutual assured destruction" (MAD), and for detangling the set of Cold War requirements that governed nuclear planning long after our foe had vanished. And it is possible that more change is on the way.

In the letter to Congress accompanying the review, Rumsfeld noted that "in the decade since the collapse of the Soviet Union, planning for the employment of U.S. nuclear forces has undergone only modest revision." This suggests that the Single Integrated Operational Plan (or SIOP), the central U.S. nuclear warfighting plan, may be revised, perhaps radically.

Still the details of exactly what is going to happen are sketchy at best, and it is clear that some things are virtually certain not to change.

The administration is still planning to keep old warheads around in a state of readiness in the event some future President wants to redeploy them. The administration will upgrade the ability to produce new warheads. It will continue development of missile defenses, national and "theater." And it will explicitly incorporate new precision-guided weapons into strategic forces, augmenting U.S. nuclear capabilities with modern conventional, cyber warfare, and directed energy weapons.

"There have been no final decisions ... on what the size of our responsive capability would be, and also there have been no final decisions made on the overall size of the active stockpile and the inactive stockpile," said J.D. Crouch, Rumsfeld's Assistant Secretary for International Security Affairs who unveiled the classified study.

In other words, nice review but less than decisive.

The Signal to the World

More flexible planning, Crouch says, will provide the capability to deal with "rogue states that we would have to deal with" and "states with WMD [weapons of mass destruction]." Most people, and most nations, would think that

this pronouncement is indistinguishable from current U.S. nuclear policy. And they would be right. Flexibility and ambiguity have been the hallmarks of U.S. nuclear strategy since at least the 1991 Gulf War. So what is different? Well I suppose one could argue that now those nuclear weapons deployed in southern Turkey will have a greater focus, and perhaps even a new set of contingency plans to back them up should an American president ever be insane enough to order their use against an Iraq or Iran. Since any use of nuclear weapons in response to a rogue state's use of biological or chemical weapons would be in extremely small numbers, and would not require the gigantic computing power or bureaucracy of U.S. Strategic Command in Omaha, the introduction of a "new" flexibility is confusing. For more than a decade such flexibility has existed: the United States has had the weapons, the capabilities, and even the contingency plans to do exactly what Crouch suggests.

The vagueness of the NPR with regard to the mission of deterring rogue states will likely encourage the nuclear laboratories to believe that it is a mandate to develop new nuclear weapons. Are new nukes really needed? American conventional precision-guided weapons have now fully matured, and there are newer conventional weapons in development, such as the Northrop-Grumman/Lockheed Martin "Big Blue," a 30,000-lb. earth penetrating guided conventional weapon. Crouch says reassuringly that "there are no recommendations in the report about developing new nuclear weapons." But he also says the U.S. is looking at "a number of initiatives" to attack deeply-buried targets.

Consider these doctrinal subtleties from the perspective of an Iraq or Iran, or North Korea . How will they view a newly announced U.S. initiative that calls for greater incorporation of conventional weaponry but doesn't close the door on using nuclear weapons? Will such states be more deterred by the Pentagon's seeming greater willingness to use nuclear weapons? Doesn't in fact the very announcement of a "new" post-September 11 U.S. flexibility on nuclear forces act as an irritant?

These questions about the NPR will likely outlive the positive media coverage of the warhead reductions. While Rumsfeld and Co. once again use the language of "transformation" to describe their latest handiwork, the reality is that the NPR, at least for now, is little more than hollow marketing of a less than reassuring product.

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Inside The Navy
January 14, 2002
Pg. 1

Pentagon Weighs Retiring Nuclear-Tipped Tomahawk Cruise Missiles

The Bush administration's Nuclear Posture Review directs the Pentagon to reconsider allowing the Navy to cease maintaining its arsenal of nuclear-tipped Tomahawk cruise missiles, Inside the Navy has learned.

A senior Navy official told ITN the new NPR calls for a study of the issue that is expected to produce conclusions within six months. If the study supports canceling the nuclear version of the Tomahawk Land Attack Missile, known as the TLAM/N program, it could mark the end of the Navy's nuclear-tipped sea-launched cruise missiles. The role of the weapons has diminished in recent years, though some analysts once called them the "fourth leg" of the Pentagon's nuclear triad.

The triad, the mainstay of U.S. nuclear forces, has for years consisted of land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles, Air Force bombers and sea-launched ballistic missiles. At a press briefing last week, officials from the Office of the Secretary of Defense discussed elements of the new NPR, including plans to build a new triad relying on non-nuclear and nuclear strike capabilities, new defenses and a "responsive infrastructure." Nuclear Tomahawks were not discussed at the press briefing, nor were they mentioned in an unclassified summary of the NPR provided to reporters by the Pentagon.

At press time Friday (Jan. 11), a Defense Department spokeswoman declined to comment on what the NPR says about TLAM/N, saying it is hard to address the subject without discussing classified information.

In 2000, however, ITN reported that Navy officials at the Pentagon, including submariners, had been trying to shed the financial burden of maintaining the nuclear-tipped cruise missiles. OSD rebuked such attempts in closed-door budget drills (ITN, June 19, 2000, p1).

In budget documents submitted to OSD in 2000, the Navy put the TLAM/N program in a category of duplicative or low-performance programs deemed not cost effective. In those documents, the Navy proposed terminating the program, saying it could thereby recoup \$72 million in the department's six-year budget plan.

Specifically, the Navy proposed canceling the annual recertifications of the nuclear-tipped Tomahawks and buying only three ship sets of a new portable launch system. Those moves would have allowed the service to retain a reconstitution capability while shifting \$72 million to higher priority programs, the Navy argued at the time. Had OSD accepted the Navy's proposal, it probably would have withered the TLAM/N capability, which depends on annual recertifications of warheads conducted by DOD and the Energy Department.

Uncertainty has clouded the future of TLAM/N for years. The 1998 review of nuclear deterrence conducted for the Pentagon by the Defense Science Board raised questions about the future need for the missile, though it urged extending the service life of nuclear-tipped cruise missiles to 2030.

"As in the case of Air Force [dual capable aircraft], the long term rationale and support for TLAM/N capabilities is uncertain at best," concluded the DSB report, which did not necessarily represent DOD's official position.

Development of TLAM/N preceded that of the conventional Tomahawk missile well known for strikes during the 1991 Persian Gulf War. During the 1980s, about 350 of the nuclear Tomahawks were deployed on Navy surface ships and submarines, according to the Washington, DC-based Center for Defense Information, an independent military research organization.

Although former President George Bush directed an end to TLAM/N deployments a decade ago, the weapon remains a part of the Navy's submarine-capable nuclear arsenal. The 1994 Nuclear Posture Review eliminated the option to carry nuclear Tomahawks on surface ships but retained the capability to deploy the weapons on attack subs. The 1998 DSB report on nuclear deterrence said TLAM/N capabilities could be regenerated within 30 days on attack subs, if necessary.

TLAM/N missiles carry a W80 warhead with a nuclear yield of 200 kilotons. The nuclear Tomahawk was developed during the late 1970s and early 1980s in large part to be a "counter-force warfighting nuclear weapon," as part of then-President Ronald Reagan's defense strategy, Jon Wolfsthal of the Carnegie Non-Proliferation Project told ITN in 2000. There is no legal constraint on the deployment of TLAM/N systems, Wolfsthal said then.

Given its range of 2,500 kilometers, the nuclear Tomahawk has been considered a tactical nuke, compared to strategic weapons with longer ranges.

"In fact, the Russians became extremely nervous about these because they could be forward deployed on submarines or surface ships and had a real strategic value against Russian territory, Soviet territory, but yet weren't counted in strategic arms control agreements because they are considered to be tactical nuclear weapons," Wolfsthal told ITN in 2000.

-- *Christopher J. Castelli*

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Army Times
January 21, 2002
Pg. 22

CDC Warns Civilians Anthrax Vaccine May Be Linked To Birth Defects

By Deborah Funk, Times staff writer

The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention are warning civilians that the anthrax vaccine may be linked to birth defects if given during pregnancy, according to data from a preliminary Navy study that is still under review.

"At this time no one knows for sure whether this vaccine can cause fetal harm," the CDC said.

The warning is part of a new informed-consent form created by the CDC for certain civilian postal workers and Capitol Hill staff who have been offered the vaccine on a voluntary basis in the wake of the recent anthrax mail attacks.

The notice is the first public acknowledgement of a potential link between the vaccine and birth defects, and it contradicts an Army study at Fort Stewart, Ga., that found no reproductive health problems related to the anthrax vaccine for military women who received the shots.

Details of the new study are sparse. Neither the CDC nor the Pentagon would say what types of birth defects were found, the rates, who was studied or what time period the study covers. Defense officials would say only that the Navy conducted the study.

"The report is still in draft form only and is currently undergoing revisions," said CDC spokesman Llewyn Grant. "It's not yet available for public release."

Defense officials said they would not provide details until they checked the accuracy of the information. "We're trying to figure out if the numbers the computer spit out can be relied on or not," said Army Lt. Col. John Grabenstein, deputy director of clinical operations for the Pentagon's Anthrax Vaccine Immunization Program Agency.

Defense officials gave the information on the recent Navy study to the CDC "because it was data in our possession," Grabenstein said. "We were trying to be responsible."

Navy officials acknowledged the existence of the study, but they too would provide no other information. In a prepared statement, the Navy Bureau of Medicine and Surgery said:

"Initial findings from research conducted at the Naval Health Research Center (NHRC) suggest that anthrax vaccine administered to women during pregnancy may be associated with a higher risk of birth defects in their infants" compared to infants of unvaccinated women and those inoculated before and after pregnancy.

The study results "relied solely on automated data, not individual health record review or patient interviews," and must be validated, according to the statement.

"BUMED will expeditiously validate the data and methods upon which the research study is based. Results will be completed as soon as possible."

Officials expect to finish validating the study by early April, said BUMED spokesman Lt. j.g. Mike Kafka.

The statement noted that Defense Department policy defers administering vaccines, including the anthrax vaccine, to pregnant women.

"Nonetheless, women may receive the vaccine before they know they are pregnant," the statement went on.

"Regardless of this study's results, DoD is redoubling its efforts to prevent the inadvertent vaccination of pregnant women."

Retired Air Force Col. Redmond Handy, who opposes the mandatory anthrax inoculation program, said he has heard from many women who report that military health-care providers ask no questions about possible pregnancies before giving the shots.

"That's abuse," said Handy, president of NOABUSE, the National Organization of Americans Battling Unnecessary Servicemember Endangerment.

The military began vaccinating troops against anthrax more than three years ago. Although the anthrax vaccine, like other inactivated vaccines, is deferred during pregnancy under Pentagon policy, the Defense Department's anthrax vaccine Web site states that "if a vaccine is inadvertently given to a pregnant woman, no adverse pregnancy outcome or fetal harm is expected because of the vaccine's inactive state."

Civilian postal workers and Capitol Hill staff must sign a consent form to take the anthrax vaccine because it is being used in a different way than approved under its license and because the vaccine batch being offered to them is not approved by the Food and Drug Administration.

Those civilians would get the vaccine after potential exposure and would receive only three shots. Under its license, the vaccine is given before exposure to prevent infection and six shots are given over 18 months.

The military's anthrax vaccine program has stalled because of a supply problem as the sole maker of the vaccine, BioPort Inc., tries to win FDA approval of its production license after completing major upgrades to its plant. The vaccine offered to civilians was made after the renovations and is not FDA-approved. The agency still is reviewing BioPort's license.

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Defense Week
January 14, 2002
Pg. 1

Raytheon Discusses Defending Nuclear Sites With Phalanx

By Ron Laurenzo

Raytheon Co. is consulting with the Department of Energy about using the company's rapid-fire Phalanx gun systems to protect nuclear reactors, plutonium storage sites and national laboratories from terrorist attacks, sources have told Defense Week.

The Phalanx gun system, deployed on Navy warships since the late 1970s, shreds targets with a stream of 20 mm armor-piercing bullets fired from a six-barrel Gatling gun. The self-guided, rapid-reaction system can track and destroy a range of threats—including small boats, trucks, aircraft, cruise missiles and artillery shells.

Phalanx is among the most sensational military technologies under consideration for use in homeland defense.

Raytheon officials said federal agencies—as well as foreign nations—had expressed interest in using Phalanx for "high-value site defense" before Sept. 11, but interest has surged since then. Talks about using Phalanx to protect Energy Department sites have not previously been publicized.

Company executives confirmed they have had talks with officials from government agencies—without naming them. Sources said the Energy nuclear facilities were among the organizations talking with Raytheon about Phalanx. The Department of Energy did not respond to repeated requests for comment.

A terrorist-piloted airliner or Cessna 172 would be easy pickings for Phalanx, which has knocked down 155 mm artillery rounds and Katyusha rockets in tests.

The idea "has been out there for a while, and of course the events of September have just sped up the discussions dramatically," said John Eagles, a Raytheon spokesman. He said foreign governments, which company officials declined to name, have also inquired in recent years about putting a Phalanx system on a truck for mobile defense of critical sites.

A Phalanx mount weighs about seven tons and consists of the gun and ammo, a search-and-track radar coupled with a forward-looking infrared sensor and an electro-optical camera. The system works autonomously, but functions as part of a networked system aboard Navy ships.

A Raytheon plant in Louisville, Ky., is remanufacturing older model Navy Phalanxes into a new model, the Block 1B, which it also makes for foreign customers. A new Phalanx Block 1B would cost around \$9 million.

Falling shot

The possibility of using Phalanx on U.S. soil raises prickly questions about command and control and the potential for causing civilian casualties.

"That's a [expletive] serious weapon," said a congressional aide. "To use that, you'd have to ... go through some sort of public hearing about safety issues, because those bullets could keep on going for a long way."

Raytheon officials say they have long been aware of the "falling shot" problem—caused when large, supersonic bullets miss a target and keep flying until they fall to the ground or hit a building. In a worst case scenario, Raytheon program officials said the solid, armor-piercing rounds now used by the Navy could go as far as 12 kilometers (7 miles).

To fix that problem, Raytheon partnered with a national laboratory to develop a new bullet that has a small amount of explosive and a fuze, said Scott Martin, program manager for Raytheon's high-value site defense efforts in Tucson, Ariz. The new round is more deadly against "soft" targets such as airliners and trucks and self-destructs if it misses its target. Martin declined to name the laboratory.

The explosive rounds are enough to destroy an airplane or a bomb-laden truck, Martin said, "Yet if they do not impact the target, the fuze would burn out and would rapidly disassemble the round again."

Furthermore, if used in site defense, Phalanx would be set up in a defined area, so its fire zones could be pre-determined.

"You can easily look down range and predict where the falling shot [will be]," said Dennis Carroll, Raytheon's Phalanx program manager. "It's simple physics where the rounds will go."

Carroll said Phalanx can destroy a slow target like an airliner or private aircraft with fewer rounds because they are easier for Phalanx to hit.

Command and control

Another major question arises about Phalanx: Who gives the order to let it fire? The decision to tear an airliner to shreds is likely one beyond a local security chief, even at a major installation such as Los Alamos National Laboratory, N.M., or the Pantex plutonium storage site near Amarillo, Texas.

Raytheon program officials are confident that command and control of a Phalanx system could be tied into a system that would allow high-ranking decision-makers to call the shots. They cite the fact that the system has always been part of an integrated defense in the Navy, where it communicates with other systems, such as Aegis radar.

Phalanx's radar could be tied into Federal Aviation Administration air-traffic control radars, said Carroll, so the Phalanx operator would have the same picture as controllers. For example, an FAA controller could warn Phalanx's operator to pay attention to an aircraft acting suspiciously.

Carroll said the final decision about who would "release" Phalanx to engage a target—the operator doesn't actually pull the trigger, the system decides on its own where to shoot and how many rounds to fire—is beyond Raytheon's scope. However, he said the decision could be made "a thousand miles away" because Phalanx's information can be piped to a command authority. He emphasized that it would never act in a purely automatic mode.

The speed with which Phalanx can react—its primary mission is to destroy a cruise missile in the last five seconds of flight—would buy decision-makers time to assess a threat, said Martin.

"We act very quickly if something deviates from its flight path," he said.

"There's no need for a long-range engagement, because all you really want to do is make sure that airliner or major parts of it do not enter into the protected zone," said Carroll. Preferably, a Phalanx-defended site would have open space around it to provide a safe space for debris to crash.

The system could be manned by Navy reserves or even by contractors from Raytheon, said Carroll.

Fields of fire

Another concern: Phalanx would actively track innocent airliners or private aircraft. But Carroll said Phalanx would never slew its cannon unless there was a legitimate threat. It would ignore local air traffic if a site were near an airport or airway—until an aircraft altered its flight path in a way that could bring it into Phalanx's turf.

In that case, it would begin tracking with its radar and forward-looking infrared sensors and could provide its operator with high-resolution images of the potential threat with its electro-optical camera.

Basically, it would work like it does in a Navy carrier battle group, where Phalanxes are programmed to watch certain sectors for threats, not aim at F-18s coming in to land.

Phalanx could also deal with ground threats that would overwhelm guards armed with small arms, such as a large truck packed with explosives.

"Pumping 4,500 rounds a minute into it is going to tear the whole structure apart," Carroll said.

Whether Phalanx or similar weapons are employed in homeland defense seems to be as much a political and psychological issue as one of effectiveness.

Jack Spencer, a defense analyst at the conservative Heritage Foundation in Washington, D.C., said command-and-control issues would have to be worked out. Public opinion, he said, likely would be related to the extensiveness of a deployment of surface-to-air weapons.

"If you're talking about minimal deployment at high-risk, high-value targets, I think that the public discussion would be less heated," he said. But a widespread deployment of anti-air capabilities could generate public resistance.

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Los Angeles Times

January 16, 2002

Pg. 1

U.S.-Russia Uranium Pact Stalls

Energy: A price dispute could lead to a nuclear power fuel shortage and hurt national security.

By David Willman and Alan C. Miller, Times Staff Writers

WASHINGTON -- A landmark 1993 agreement to sell tons of uranium stripped from Russian warheads to fuel American power plants is in jeopardy because of a dispute over price between the Russians and a U.S. company. The standoff between the Russians and the U.S. company responsible for carrying out the deal already has stalled shipment of uranium to the United States. And arms control specialists are concerned that a collapse of the deal could increase the chance of terrorists or rogue nations obtaining the nuclear material.

A senior Bush administration official, Energy Undersecretary Robert G. Card, told the American company in a letter last week that "U.S. strategic interests may be at risk if the [firm] cannot ensure continuity of shipments of Russian down-blended [uranium] to the United States."

Card said the disagreement could also lead to "a nuclear power fuel shortage" here; the U.S. company relies heavily on the uranium purchased from Russia for sales that it makes to American nuclear power plants. The company supplies about 70% of the uranium fuel used in American nuclear plants, which generate about one-fifth of all electricity used in the U.S.

The high stakes illuminate an anomaly in how the United States has handled a crucial national security function: Since mid-1998, the government has ceded to the private company, USEC Inc. of Bethesda, Md., far-reaching responsibility for implementing the agreement with the Russians to purchase 500 metric tons of military uranium. Because USEC and the Russians remain at odds over pricing, no shipments have been authorized for 2002.

Ordinarily, the year's first load of uranium--three metric tons, or enough for about 120 nuclear warheads--would have been ordered by October and would begin flowing to the United States in March.

In a written response to Card on Thursday, USEC President William H. Timbers Jr. said that the energy official's letter "undermines and could significantly affect the ability of [USEC] to reach prompt and successful agreement" with the Russians regarding the 1993 uranium deal. Timbers also termed Card's concerns about a possible shortage of nuclear-power fuel "unwarranted and disingenuous."

Copies of the letters were obtained by The Times.

A USEC spokesman said Tuesday that the company expects to resolve its differences with the Russians without any serious consequences.

A Bush administration official familiar with the current talks said that USEC and the Russians "seem to be at loggerheads. . . . I think [the uranium agreement] is in jeopardy. I would not characterize this as normal negotiations." The official spoke on condition of anonymity.

1993 Agreement Is Seen as a Watershed

From the standpoint of those concerned about the potential spread of nuclear weaponry in the aftermath of the Cold War, the 1993 U.S.-Russian accord, known as "Megatons to Megawatts," was a watershed.

During a 20-year period, the U.S. government would purchase about 500 metric tons (about 1.1 million pounds) of highly enriched uranium stripped from former Soviet warheads. The purchase proceeds would employ thousands of Russian scientists and technicians, who would blend down, or dilute, the material for use as fuel in commercial nuclear power plants.

The deal appeared to have several attractive features.

The securing of the weapon-grade uranium--at a price of approximately \$12 billion--would keep it from well-capitalized terrorists such as Osama bin Laden. And by employing Russians to blend down the material to commercial-grade fuel, the deal would help dissuade them from selling their services to others who covet nuclear materials and expertise, such as Iraq or Iran.

The purchases of Russian uranium began in 1995, under the purview of the U.S. Department of Energy and the government-held United States Enrichment Corp., a precursor of USEC Inc. Then-President Clinton, with bipartisan congressional backing, approved privatizing the corporation in 1997. And in 1998, investors bought the entity from the government in a deal worth nearly \$1.9 billion. Its shares trade on the New York Stock Exchange.

The newly privatized USEC Inc. remained the exclusive U.S. agent for the Russian uranium deal. In the last seven years, USEC has paid \$2.2 billion for fuel derived from 141 metric tons of weapon-grade enriched uranium from the Russians, the equivalent of about 5,600 warheads.

More than half of the uranium fuel that USEC sells to utility companies comes from Russia; the company also produces it at a single plant in Paducah, Ky.

For the Russians, the value of the uranium deal is huge--as much as \$700 million a year. The sale proceeds provide a significant revenue source for Russia's Ministry of Atomic Energy, which is responsible for safeguarding nuclear material at production and research facilities.

Security at many of the sites has long been lax, U.S. officials say. A number of government reports have documented the shortcomings, such as porous fencing, an absence of video surveillance and nuclear workers who have gone unpaid for months at a time.

"The uranium deal is the only thing that stands between anarchy and stability in the Russian nuclear weapons complex," said Thomas L. Neff, a Massachusetts Institute of Technology physicist who in 1991 first proposed the Megatons to Megawatts concept to the White House and the Russians.

Indeed, the decision to turn day-to-day implementation of the agreement over to private industry raised concerns among some policymakers. The chairman of Clinton's Council of Economic Advisors, Joseph B. Stiglitz, opposed the arrangement at the time. He later termed it "bad national security policy and bad economic policy."

USEC executives have consistently said that the company's profit-making imperatives do not conflict with the federal government's national security needs.

The specifics of the current dispute can be traced to early 2000, when USEC made a contract proposal--subject to the approval of both governments--for new pricing terms that would have taken effect this month. The proposed terms would have enabled USEC to purchase uranium for about 15% less than the Russians received in 2001.

However, the Russians did not agree to the revised terms at an annual review last fall, when the first order for a 2002 uranium shipment was to have been placed. With no new terms ratified, USEC would be obligated by contract to pay the same price for uranium this year that the Russians charged in 2001.

But USEC has declined to order deliveries for 2002 unless Russia accepts its lower-price terms through 2013.

Neither side has yielded, precipitating the potential breakdown in the Megatons to Megawatts deal.

The uncertainty over the uranium agreement comes at a time when USEC is counting on a restructuring of the deal to help its bottom line.

The company warned in a financial statement filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission for the quarter ending Sept. 30 that it could suffer without the more favorable terms. Without the Russian and U.S. governments agreeing to those provisions by Jan. 1, USEC said, "earnings and cash flow in fiscal 2002 and thereafter would be adversely affected and would be substantially lower than currently projected, absent USEC making other arrangements."

USEC engaged in multiple rounds of negotiations in Moscow last month without success. Just last week, it sent its senior vice president, Phillip G. Sewell, back to Moscow in an attempt to push the Russians to accept USEC's latest offer. The Russians declined.

The interruption of the uranium shipments comes only a month after President Bush vowed to expand U.S. cooperation with Russia. The president said he wanted to "dismantle strategic weapons, reduce nuclear material and increase security at nuclear sites" as part of an international effort to "keep the world's most dangerous technologies out of the hands of the world's most dangerous people." He cited this as a heightened priority after the Sept. 11 attacks.

Charles B. Curtis, deputy Energy secretary under Clinton, said that any schism in implementing the uranium agreement with the Russians creates related national security problems.

Such discord, Curtis said, "has an immediate consequence. And putting that [U.S.-Russian] cooperation at risk is a tremendous national security consequence." Curtis noted that on other occasions when the Russians took umbrage at the American handling of the uranium purchases, they blocked U.S. observers from visiting Russian nuclear facilities, preventing verification of whether weapon-grade materials were adequately safeguarded.

"The U.S. government needs to play a stronger supervisory role over the commercial activities of USEC," Curtis said. "There needs to be an active and purposeful oversight of this commercial arrangement. And I think that's not evident."

The spokesman for USEC, Charles B. Yulish, said the company is continuing to actively negotiate and fully expects to reach an agreement.

"We're seeking a prompt resolution to this matter and that's why we're fully engaged with the Russians to seek mutually acceptable terms," Yulish said. " . . . They have the incentive to take the right deal and we have the incentive to offer it. But right now it's one of those negotiating deals that you just have to be patient with."

Yulish said that USEC's efforts to win new terms for the uranium agreement have been complicated by the changeover of administrations in Washington and by new leadership at Russia's atomic energy ministry. Both governments must approve any change in terms.

A spokesman for the Russian Embassy in Washington said Tuesday, "We're not in a position to comment."

Bush Team Urges Firm to Avoid Further Delays

In his letter last week to USEC's president, Card emphasized that the Bush administration wants the company to immediately take steps necessary to resume shipments of the Russians' military uranium. Card suggested that USEC should not risk further delay of shipments in 2002 by holding out for better long-term prices.

"Our first priority remains the continuity of shipments of down-blended Russian [uranium] in 2002," Card wrote in his letter to USEC's president, Timbers. " . . . I want to stress that this is a requirement for the U.S. Government and that no long-term contract will be reviewed favorably unless it contains a separate mechanism to ensure 2002 deliveries. Given the lack of progress on [the] negotiations, we support focusing on 2002 at this time."

Timbers countered in his letter to Card that USEC has "been working diligently in these negotiations to advance the long-term strategic interest of the U.S. by pursuing the long-term stability of the [uranium] Agreement--not some stop-gap approach that will lead to continued uncertainty in this important program."

According to Timbers, four previous disruptions to the uranium shipments were the fault of the Russians. But critics say that USEC contributed to some delays out of financial interest.

The current dispute comes as USEC is discussing a range of issues with the Bush administration, including continuation of its role as the exclusive agent for the Russian uranium deal. The administration can, at any time, appoint a new agent or an additional agent to compete with USEC for the purchases.

Several U.S. electric utilities that purchase uranium from USEC have told the administration they are now interested in buying the product directly from Russia.

Times research librarian Janet Lundblad in Los Angeles contributed to this report.

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InsideDefense.com

January 15, 2002

Rumsfeld: U.S. In 'Final Stages' Of Inspecting Possible Afghan WMD Sites

U.S. forces in Afghanistan are in the "final stages" of searching sites that Pentagon officials suspect could house weapons of mass destruction, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld said today.

"We're in the final stages of working on the so-called possible weapons of mass destruction sites," Rumsfeld told radio reporters at the Pentagon. "I don't know that that's a great characterization of it, but we received reports numbering in the many dozens, three or four or five dozen locations. A number of them, most of them now have been examined and the materials from them have been sent for processing and evaluation."

Rumsfeld said up to 10 sites are still being examined, and Defense Department officials have not yet received reports on some of the sites that were searched. A number of them, he added, turned out to be drug-processing sites.

"It would be a terrible thing for the world if Afghanistan returned to drug production in a large way," Rumsfeld said.

"But many of those locations have been destroyed and that part of the process also is going on."

Rumsfeld said preliminary analysis of the sites where radioactivity was detected shows they "might have [had] depleted uranium warheads as opposed to something that could be considered a radiation weapon as such."

"People have used depleted uranium warheads because of their penetration characteristics for years," he said, "and at . . . the moment, one of the locations where radiation was detected that turned out to be the case."

-- John Liang

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Wall Street Journal

January 16, 2002

Anthrax Vaccine May Increase Incidence Of Birth Defects For Pregnant Women

By Laura Johannes, Staff Reporter of The Wall Street Journal

A preliminary U.S. Navy study has found that use of the anthrax vaccine in pregnant women may cause a higher incidence of birth defects.

The study, while unconfirmed, complicates the already difficult decision as to whether those potentially exposed to anthrax bacteria should get inoculated. Thousands of Capitol employees and postal workers may have been exposed to the bacteria through contaminated letters this fall.

Some physicians recommend that those individuals get vaccinated even if they have no symptoms, since the bacteria can linger in the body for months.

So far, results of the study remain under wraps. In response to questions, the Navy disclosed its findings in general terms. However, it declined to release any other information -- including basic details about how many people were in the study or how it was designed.

"I can't tell you much about it because the study's not complete yet," said Capt. Ryland Dodge, a spokesman for the Navy's medical department. Analysis of the results is expected to be completed by early April.

In a written statement, the Navy said its results suggest that the vaccine "may be associated with a higher risk of birth defects" in the infants of women who were inoculated during pregnancy.

It described the results as "initial findings," which it is in the process of validating. In recent months, the U.S.

Department of Health and Human Services has been making the vaccine available to civilians who may have been exposed to anthrax. However, HHS hasn't taken a position on whether people should take it. Such postexposure vaccination is still considered experimental. In its extensive warning about possible vaccine side effects, HHS

discloses that the Navy study found a possible link to birth defects. However, it adds, "At this time no one knows for sure whether this vaccine can cause fetal harm."

The anthrax vaccine, made by closely held BioPort Corp. of Lansing, Mich., has sparked protests among military personnel required to take it as a condition of service.

Some who received it claim it caused serious health problems, and more than 100 troops have faced courts-martial rather than get the vaccine.

The military has long maintained that the anthrax vaccine, given in six doses over 18 months, is safe. However, the military has a longstanding policy of not giving the vaccine to pregnant women, based on a recommendation from the Food and Drug Administration.

In recent years, the anthrax vaccine has been in short supply because of quality-control problems at BioPort.

Following the anthrax attacks, making more anthrax vaccine became a national priority, and BioPort late last month received FDA approval for a renovated factory. However, before it can distribute the vaccine, BioPort still must complete work on two quality-control tests and gain agency approval for a Spokane, Wash., facility where the vaccine is placed in vials.

BioPort had no immediate comment on the study.

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Jerusalem Post
January 16, 2002

US-Israel Talks To Focus On Iran's Missile Program

By Janine Zacharia

WASHINGTON - The US and Israel will hold high-level discussions on Iran's attempts to acquire nuclear technology and advanced conventional weaponry, primarily from Russia, in Tel Aviv tomorrow. The talks are a follow-up to discussions here in October.

Officials will also discuss Iraq and proliferation attempts in countries like Syria, Libya, and Sudan. The Syrians are "working on nuclear stuff. They're working on biological weapons and chemical weapons, too," a senior administration official said on Monday.

An American delegation of roughly 12 diplomats, defense experts, and intelligence officials is being led by Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International Security John Bolton. Bolton arrives today and is due to meet with Foreign Minister Shimon Peres and other Foreign Ministry officials.

Israel will be represented by Minister Dan Meridor, National Security Adviser Uzi Dayan, and Gideon Franks, head of the Atomic Energy Agency.

The senior administration official said the Palestinian Authority attempt to smuggle in a cache of Iranian-made weaponry makes the subject even more pressing.

"The main purpose is to talk about where we are with the Russians and the Iranians," he said. "And obviously now with this boat, whatever you want to say about [PA Chairman Yasser] Arafat's involvement - it seems pretty clear that he knew about it - the Iranian connection is not disputed by anybody.

"The issue of Iranian conventional weapons, advanced conventional weapons, nuclear missiles is even more timely than it has been."

He said the sides will try to "deepen our coordination about how to deal with the problem" of Russian support for Iranian weapons programs.

The US, in the context of its missile defense talks with the Russians, has been trying unsuccessfully to persuade them to halt unsanctioned nuclear cooperation with Iran.

During a December trip to Moscow, when the US informed Russia it would pull out of the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, Secretary of State Colin Powell told President Vladimir Putin while in 2001 the US was focused on missile defense, "questions of non-proliferation are going to be higher on the US-Russia agenda this year than they had been," according to the official.

"Russia wants to get closer to the West. Russia's behavior on a lot of issues needs to change, specifically on proliferation questions. They need to behave more the way we do," he added.

A two-part series in The Washington Post this week played down the missile threat posed by Iran, particularly to the US. It highlighted difficulties Iran has had in development of its Shahab-3 missile, which has a range of 1,500 kilometers, and said weapons transfers between Russia and Iran have been overstated.

It also argued intelligence forecasts are misguided by "a concerted campaign by the Republican-dominated Congress, supported by Israel, to focus attention on the leakage of missile technology from Russia to Iran."

"A detailed analysis of all allegations of missile component transfer between Russia and Iran over the past decade suggests that transfers have been sporadic, low-level, and largely confined to dual-use materials that can be used for missile construction rather than entire missile systems or even sub-systems such as engines or guidance packages," the Post story said.

The stories went on to say despite Iranian setbacks, "most experts agree that Iran will perfect and eventually deploy the Shahab-3 missile, enabling it to reach targets in Israel."

Since the last US-Israel consultations, delegations from Iran have continued to visit Russia and work on its missile program has continued unabated. Discussions, however, on Iranian proliferation will go beyond the Russian supply. Bolton plans briefing on North Korea's and China's contributions, too.

"Even if we solve the Russia-Iran problem on missiles, we haven't solved the Iran missile problem," the official said.

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Jerusalem Post
January 16, 2002

US Trying To Stop Arrow Sale To India

By Janine Zacharia

WASHINGTON - American officials are trying to block Israel from selling the Arrow anti-missile system, jointly produced with the US, to India.

A senior administration official said selling the system could violate the Missile Technology Control Regime, a voluntary arrangement among 27 countries consisting of agreed export policies applied to a common list of controlled items.

"The Arrow is an MTCR category-one missile," he said Monday. "That means you probably can't do it."

The arrangement restricts the export of delivery systems and related technology for those systems capable of carrying a 500-kg payload at least 300 kilometers. The official said the Arrow could have that capability.

But Israeli officials are arguing that the parameters of the Arrow - the size of its payload and its range - are much smaller than what is regulated by MTCR, and therefore it should be free to sell it.

Israel, which abides by MTCR, further argues the system is defensive in nature and is not meant for the launching of offensive attacks.

Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International Security John Bolton met with Ambassador to the US David Ivry last week and said Israel should explain in writing why the Arrow should be sold to India.

"The Israelis were told to send in an application, but that they'd better address the question of the Missile Technology Control Regime and why we want to sell anything to Pakistan or India at the current time," the official said.

The US is carefully monitoring and trying to defuse tensions between India and Pakistan, fearful the two nuclear powers could go to war. A senior Israeli diplomat said the Americans are raising MTCR as an "excuse" to try to prevent the sale of the Arrow.

"We can convince them the Arrow is not included in MTCR," he said. "People in the administration are not too happy to see any weapons sold to India or Pakistan right now. It appears they are using MTCR as an excuse."

He said the Arrow is designed for shorter distances, although it could possibly travel 300 km.

It is unclear, however, if it can carry a 500-kg payload that distance.

The American official disagreed with this argument, saying that the Arrow could also be turned into an offensive weapon.

"The problem is MTCR defines the missile as having a payload capability at a given range, and when the warhead drops on your head, the fact that it says, 'I'm really a [defensive] ABM missile' doesn't make things any better - especially now, given the situation in the subcontinent," he said.

A subsystem of the Arrow, the Green Pine radar used by the Arrow 2, was sold to India with US approval and has been deployed there for almost a year.

Regarding Israel's proposed sale of the Phalcon AWACS system to India, State Department spokesman Phil Reeker said the US supports the "transfer of the Phalcon to India, and we'll continue to have consultations with Israel on the capabilities and timing related to that."

But the senior US official hinted while a US authorization "in principle" of any sales of the Phalcon still stands, the US could try again to block the sale, as it did in 2000, when Israel sold the system to China and was forced by the US not transfer the system to Beijing.

The Phalcon would allow India to survey a large area from the sky, and locate and track targets.

Yarden Vatikai, spokesman for Defense Minister Binyamin Ben-Eliezer, said: "We view relations with India as very important. We are aware of the sensitivities of the United States and the situation at this time."

Israel is India's second largest arms supplier, after Russia. According to foreign reports, over \$3 billion in arms deals are in the pipeline.

Arieh O'Sullivan contributed to this report.

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Moscow Times
January 16, 2002
Pg. 3

U.S., Russia Tackle Nuclear Cuts In 2-Day Talks

By Megan Twohey, Staff Writer

Two days of talks between Russian and U.S. military officials began Tuesday in Washington, with plans for joint reductions in nuclear arms promising to be one of the more explosive items on the agenda.

Russia opposes U.S. plans to store, not destroy, at least some of the thousands of warheads it has agreed to cut, and it wants a formal treaty on the cuts pledged last year by Presidents Vladimir Putin and George W. Bush. U.S.

Congressman Curt Weldon, who was in Moscow on Tuesday, reiterated the Bush administration's position that the relationship between the two countries has changed so as to make a treaty unnecessary.

"When we deal with the British or French, we don't have to write down how many items we have," Weldon, a senior member of the House of Representatives Armed Services Committee, said on Ekho Moskv radio. "We're friends."

But the Foreign Ministry has said Russia wants a treaty that would make the cuts irreversible. At their meetings in November, Bush promised to reduce the U.S. arsenal of about 7,000 strategic warheads down to between 1,700 and 2,200, while Putin promised to cut Russia's arsenal of about 6,000 to between 1,500 and 2,200. Assistant U.S.

Secretary of Defense J.D. Crouch alarmed Moscow last week when he said the Pentagon has plans to store at least some of the warheads for possible emergency redeployment.

But more important to Russia than the destination of the warheads is what happens to the delivery vehicles -- the nuclear missiles and bombers -- said Alexander Pikayev, co-chair of the nonproliferation program at the Moscow Carnegie Center. "This is the key question," Pikayev said. "Russia wants them to be destroyed or modified in a way that would prevent the U.S. from rapidly uploading the [stored] warheads." If the United States stores both the warheads and delivery vehicles, its arms reduction will be useless, said Alexander Konovalov, president of the Institute for Strategic Assessments.

"It would be more of a de-alerting," he said. "The U.S. would be able to install the warheads back on the missiles in a matter of weeks, maybe days."

U.S. officials have not spelled out what would happen to the warheads' delivery vehicles. Under past nuclear arms control treaties, which did not specify the treatment of dismantled warheads, Russia and the United States used them for various purposes. During the Cold War, both countries used the fissile materials from them to manufacture new weapons. Afterward, when the demand for more nuclear arms ceased, Russia and the United States used or sold the plutonium and uranium extracted from the warheads. Both have also stored some of their dismantled warheads.

What Russia will do with the thousands of nuclear warheads it has pledged to dismantle remains uncertain. It may be cheaper and safer for Russia to do what the United States is doing and store the actual warheads rather than process the plutonium and uranium, experts said. Both options, however, require the funding and construction of storage facilities and security.

This week's meeting is likely to lay these issues on the table. When the talks started Tuesday, U.S. Undersecretary of Defense Douglas Feith met privately with Colonel General Yuri Baluyevsky, first deputy of the General Staff, who is leading the Russian delegation, and then they joined their teams in a third-floor conference room at the Pentagon,

Reuters reported from Washington. No details of this round of talks were expected before they were completed late Wednesday. Baluyevsky said before leaving Moscow that the aim was to reach an agreement on the arms cuts before Bush visits Moscow later this spring.

Also on the agenda this week are prospective joint military exercises and possible cooperation against new terrorism threats, The Associated Press reported, citing a senior official in the Bush administration. Weldon said Tuesday that the United States and Russia should work together on missile defense to protect themselves from countries such as North Korea and China, AP reported.

"Russia wrote the book on missile defense systems," Weldon said, citing the missile shield that protects Moscow.

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Washington Post

January 16, 2002

Pg. 11

Ridge Backs Boost In Security Funds

By Reuters

Homeland Security Director Tom Ridge discussed with local government officials yesterday a "substantial" increase in federal funding for state and local security efforts, a spokesman said.

Spokesman Gordon Johndroe said Ridge, a former governor of Pennsylvania, met with representatives of the National League of Cities, whose members, like other state and local governments, are staggering under the weight of higher security costs since Sept. 11.

"The governor repeated what he has been saying now for some time: that cities are on the frontlines of the war on terrorism. The first responders are a top priority for him, and he talked to them about a substantial increase in the budget for first responders," Johndroe said.

He said Ridge also met with officials from the National Governors Association and other groups. In December, governors estimated the unbudgeted state and local costs of heightened security at \$4 billion to \$5 billion for fiscal 2002.

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Wednesday January 16 11:58 AM ET

Memo: Senate Building to Reopen

By JESSE J. HOLLAND, Associated Press Writer

WASHINGTON (AP) - The Hart Senate Office Building has been declared free of anthrax and will reopen Friday for the first time since October, when an anthrax-tainted letter was opened in Majority Leader Tom Daschle's office, The Associated Press learned Wednesday.

An e-mail memo being circulated in the Senate says the Centers for Disease Control and the Environmental Protection Agency ([news](#) - [web sites](#)) have certified that the building is safe after weeks of decontamination procedures.

"We expect the Hart building to reopen at noon on Friday, Jan. 18, 2002," said the e-mail memo, which was addressed to all senators and Senate staff.

The memo was confirmed by two Senate staff sources and by an electronic message from the Senate sergeant-at-arms.

"The cleanup achieved the goal of eliminating viable anthrax spores detected in the Hart building and that it is now safe and clean to release to the Architect of the Capitol for rehabilitation and subsequent re-occupancy," the message says.

A Daschle spokeswoman referred questions to Capitol Police spokesman Dan Nichols, who did not immediately return telephone calls.

A letter opened in the South Dakota Democrat's Hart Office Building suite on Oct. 15 exposed more than two dozen people to anthrax spores and led to the closure of the Hart Senate Office Building. The Hart building, which is across the street from the Capitol, had been closed since and EPA officials have been fumigating the building. "Senator Daschle's suite where the anthrax spill occurred was fumigated successfully with chlorine dioxide gas," a second memo from the Senate sergeant-at-arms office says. "The HVAC (heating, ventilation and air conditioning) system in the southeast quadrant of the Hart Building was also fumigated successfully using chlorine dioxide gas. Post-remediation sampling including air sampling of Senator Daschle's suite and HVAC system achieved the goal of zero viable spores detected."

The chlorine gas has been removed and rendered nontoxic, the second memo said.

Cleanup and testing efforts included floor vacuuming, wiping of desks, tables, walls and other surfaces, sample swabs taken from monitor screens and air conditioning grills, air sampling and the use of chlorine dioxide liquid, chlorine dioxide gas and anti-bacterial foam.

Senators will be briefed Thursday on the reopening, the memo said.

After the tainted letter was opened, more than 5,000 environmental samples were taken in office and common areas in the Hart building. In addition, more than 6,000 nasal swabs were taken from people who may have come in contact with anthrax spores from the letter.

"Three months have passed since the initial incident and no one in the Capitol Hill community has become ill with anthrax," the memo said.

Environmental officials said Jan. 2 that they thought a third effort to decontaminate the building had been successful. The contaminated quadrant had tested positive for traces of anthrax spores after the first fumigation effort Dec. 1. A second fumigation attempt Dec. 16 failed when workers could not create the necessary levels of humidity for the gas to work properly.

http://dailynews.yahoo.com/h/ap/20020116/pl/anthrax_congress_4.html

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Ex-Dugway Chemist Accuses Army in Whistle-Blower Case

Monday, January 14, 2002

BY BRENT ISRAELSEN

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A U.S. Department of Labor judge is reviewing whether a former chemist at the Army's Dugway Proving Ground was punished for bringing to light a number of safety problems at the weapons research facility.

David W. Hall, who now lives in Salt Lake City, claims the Army took retaliatory steps against him after he complained to state and federal regulators about how Dugway handled its chemicals, tested for contamination and approved gas masks for soldiers in the Persian Gulf.

Though most of Hall's complaints involved the chemical side of Dugway's mission, two witnesses in his "whistle-blower" hearing -- which started in June and has become one of the most voluminous cases of its kind -- suggested possible security problems on the biological side as well, said Hall's attorney, Mick Harrison.

Dugway, an 800,000-acre military testing facility in the desert 60 miles southwest of Salt Lake City, is under investigation by the FBI for possibly being the source of bacteria or technology used in the anthrax-by-mail terrorism last fall. The FBI has not interviewed Hall but has contacted several of his former colleagues.

"[Hall] has shown through his testimony and through documents that there is a hostile attitude toward employees who raise safety and environmental concerns," Harrison said. "Generally speaking, [Dugway commanders] don't smile upon people taking criticisms outside the chain of command."

Dugway spokeswoman Paula Nicholson declined to discuss the Hall matter. "The Army does not have anything to say because the case is under litigation," she said.

Part of the Army's strategy, however, has been to attack Hall's credibility.

Hall, 66, filed a whistle-blower case against the Army in February 1997, four months before he retired out of what he says was fear of being fired.

"The real danger [at Dugway]," Hall said, "is a culture where employee feedback is not welcomed and extreme retaliation is the name of the game."

After a 25-year career in the private sector, including a stint with IBM, Hall joined Dugway in February 1986 to work in the facility's chemical laboratory. Since chemical weapons were banned internationally in 1972, the

laboratory's mission has been to research defensive measures, detection and decontamination equipment and cleanup methods for chemical weapons.

Almost immediately after he was hired at Dugway, Hall began raising concerns about environmental and worker safety, said Harrison, who also represents the Chemical Weapons Working Group, a citizens group based in Kentucky.

In 1989, Hall complained that Dugway was storing in too close proximity hazardous wastes that were incompatible, creating a potential fire or explosive hazard.

Harrison said Hall's complaints led to several investigations by the federal Occupational Health and Safety Administration (OSHA), which cited Dugway for several violations in 1991.

Shortly thereafter, Hall said several civilian managers at Dugway tried to get him fired.

He was eventually reassigned from the chemical laboratory to the "joint operations directorate," which does a variety of special projects. Harrison said the transfer "stifled Hall's mobility and set him up for possible failure" because he was unqualified.

Six months later, Hall was transferred back to the chemical laboratory.

During his tenure at Dugway, Hall raised a handful of other concerns:

When the Army was cleaning lewisite contamination from soils at Simpson Butte on Dugway property, Hall complained that the analytical procedures used in determining whether the soil was "clean" were faulty and likely to produce a false negative for contamination.

Lewisite, an arsenic compound, is a deadly blister agent once used in chemical weapons. It is considered to be seven times more lethal than mustard gas, which was deployed on World War I battlefields.

Several sites around the country, most notably in the Spring Valley neighborhood of Washington, D.C., have been found to be contaminated with improperly disposed lewisite.

On June 16, 1986, a civilian construction crew working on a Dugway parking lot plowed through some unusually colored soil, exposing a canister. Several of the workers were sickened.

One of the investigators was Hall, who wrote a report stating there was mustard agent present at the site. Dugway officials initially denied there was mustard agent in the area.

Hall said his report disappeared and he had to rewrite it.

To help determine the contents of old chemical-weapons munitions, the Army developed a device known as PINS, a "portable isotopic neutron spectroscopy."

Though the Army touted its effectiveness, Hall complained that it does not perform with sufficient reliability because it was unable to detect nitrogen, a key element in many chemical warfare agents and high explosives.

Incorrect characterization of a chemical could result in improper treatment and handling, which can endanger workers.

Hall was one of the chemists assigned to test and report on the effectiveness of PINS.

"I got a lot of pressure to not be entirely truthful about the results [of the PINS study]," said Hall. "To my dismay, a misleading final report was given to the state of Utah with my name on it even though I had vigorously rejected some conclusions."

One of the Army's classifications for safe handling of equipment decontaminated of chemical agent is called "Triple X."

Hall complained that the Army improperly applied the Triple X classification to hazardous waste contamination as well.

The Army was unreceptive to Hall's complaint, Harrison said.

Shortly before the United States and its allies attacked Iraq in 1991, the Army proposed distributing to troops a certain type of gas mask made with silicon rubber.

Hall and at least one other Dugway chemist pointed out that silicon has been known to absorb certain dangerous chemicals rather than shield against them.

"He was told [by his supervisors] not to talk about it for fear it would hurt morale among the troops," Harrison said.

As a result of his persistent complaints about safety and environmental issues, Hall suffered numerous retaliatory actions from Dugway, Harrison contends.

Hall claims that one Dugway commander called him a "traitor" for revealing problems to officials outside the military. Dugway also required him to undergo another background check, suspended his security clearance, attempted to lower his employee performance marks, and ordered him to undergo fitness-for-duty and mental-health examinations, he says.

As the pressure mounted, Hall filed a Department of Labor complaint in February 1997, alleging that Dugway violated the employee protection, or "whistle-blower," provision of the Resource Conservation Recovery Act.

Believing he was about to be fired from Dugway, Hall took early retirement in June 1997.

Harrison -- one of the attorneys for Steve Jones, who won a whistle-blower case after he was fired as safety officer at the Army's chemical weapons incinerator in Tooele -- said he will seek \$1 million in damages in Hall's case. A decision is expected later this year.

<http://www.sltrib.com/2002/jan/01142002/utah/167280.htm>

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Washington Post

January 17, 2002

Pg. 1

For India, Deterrence May Not Prevent War

By Rajiv Chandrasekaran, Washington Post Foreign Service

NEW DELHI, Jan. 16 -- After India and Pakistan startled the world by testing nuclear devices in 1998, the leaders of both nations insisted that their mutual possession of nuclear weaponry would deter them from going to war in the same way it ultimately did for the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War.

Now, that thinking appears to have vaporized in India. Senior officials have said they are actively considering sending troops across the border should Pakistan's president, Gen. Pervez Musharraf, fail to follow through on his pledge to crack down on Muslim extremists that India accuses of terrorism. Over the past month, India has deployed hundreds of thousands of soldiers, along with heavy artillery and short-range ballistic missile batteries, along its border with Pakistan.

Although Pakistan has warned that any Indian military action would bring a forceful response, India's leaders appear undaunted. They say a conventional conflict between the two nations would not necessarily spiral into a nuclear exchange, suggesting that the Cold War deterrence theory applies differently to South Asia in the 21st century than it did to the superpowers of the 20th century.

That attitude has alarmed diplomats and nuclear weapons specialists, who worry that the rival nations, which have fought three wars since becoming independent in 1947, are playing a dangerous game that could quickly escalate out of control. Nuclear strikes on South Asia's most populous cities would kill tens of millions of people. And unlike the United States and the Soviet Union, which had up to 30 minutes to react to a suspected nuclear missile launch before impact, India and Pakistan would have less than eight minutes, given their proximity.

Nevertheless, an Indian official said military planners are confident that a war between the two nations could be limited to a short, nonnuclear fight. "We would not resort to nuclear weapons," the official said. "And we do not envision striking [Pakistan] in a way that would lead them to use their nuclear weapons."

Officials and analysts said that if India chose to go to war, it almost certainly would not mount a broad attack on Pakistani positions along the countries' 1,800-mile border. Instead, they said, India would focus its strikes on guerrilla training camps and military facilities that it believes are used by extremists.

"There is scope for a limited war," said India's army chief, Gen. Sunderajan Padmanabhan.

The aim of such a war would not be to capture and hold territory, but to convince the Pakistani government that support for terrorist organizations can have dire consequences, Indian analysts said.

These analysts said Indian commanders believe that selective strikes across the border likely would trigger a strong response from Pakistan, but not a nuclear volley.

"There is a growing feeling that we will not be deterred by the nuclear shield of Pakistan," said Commodore Uday Bhaskar, deputy director of the Institute for Defense Studies and Analysis, a research organization affiliated with the Indian military. "India's way of looking at this is that we're not threatening Pakistan's core interests, so they would have no incentive to launch their nuclear weapons."

India has pledged not to use its nuclear weapons first in a conflict. Although Pakistan has not made the same commitment, Pakistani officials have said they do not envision a war morphing into a nuclear confrontation.

"It's something that I think one should not even consider," said Maj. Gen. Rashid Qureshi, Pakistan's chief government spokesman. "Pakistan and India are responsible nations."

Western military analysts estimate that India has 50 to 100 nuclear warheads, while Pakistan has 30 to 45. Both nations possess short-range missiles that are capable of carrying nuclear warheads.

For Pakistan, nuclear weapons have helped to make up for a significant disadvantage in conventional forces. India has more than 1.3 million active-duty soldiers compared with more than 600,000 in Pakistan. India also has more than a 2 to 1 advantage in combat aircraft as well as significantly more tanks, artillery and ships. Indian military leaders have said they do not fear Pakistan's nuclear arsenal because they believe that India, given its geographic size, could weather a first strike from Pakistani missiles, which do not have the range to hit India's southern and eastern cities. They also contend that India would survive a first strike with enough of its warheads intact to mount a retaliatory attack that would hit all of Pakistan's major cities, which are within range of India's missiles.

"We could take a strike, survive and then hit back," Indian Defense Minister George Fernandes said in a recent interview with the Hindustan Times. "Pakistan would be finished."

As a consequence, Bhaskar said, Pakistan would not use its nuclear weapons unless an Indian military strike was so severe that Pakistan's survival as a nation was threatened. "It would be like committing suicide," he said.

Analysts said Indian commanders also have been emboldened to engage in a conventional war by a 1999 invasion by Pakistani-backed guerrillas in the Kargil mountains, along the Line of Control that divides Kashmir into Indian- and Pakistani-controlled portions. In that conflict -- the largest clash between any two nuclear powers and the first major bout of fighting between the countries since the 1998 nuclear tests -- analysts said Pakistan reasoned that it could engage in battles along the border and that India would not mount a large-scale retaliation because of Pakistan's nuclear arsenal.

"The last two and a half years have given [New] Delhi time to reflect upon the lessons of Kargil," said Brahma Chellaney, a professor of security studies at the Center for Policy Research in New Delhi. "India has realized that Pakistan's nuclear weapons are useless for anything other than blackmail."

Now, he said, Indian leaders have decided that "they will not be blackmailed."

Despite the bellicose talk in New Delhi, analysts said, the fact that Pakistan has nuclear weapons has tempered India's military plans. Instead of raising the prospect of a full-scale conventional war, with ground forces rumbling into Pakistan, officials here have described the military action under consideration as "targeted" and "limited."

"Nuclear weapons have pushed the level of conflict down in South Asia," said Stephen P. Cohen, a specialist on the subcontinent at the Brookings Institution. "Both sides are exploring the fuzzy lines between a very low-intensity conflict and a conventional war."

The two nations are intimately familiar with low-grade war. For the past several years, Indian and Pakistani troops have traded small-arms and artillery fire across the Line of Control. In recent months, the level of fighting has escalated dramatically, with each side reporting double-digit casualties every few days.

"They've had years of sub-conventional conflict," said a Western diplomat in New Delhi. "To an extent, they know how to fight a limited war."

Even so, nuclear weapons specialists said they are concerned by reports that both countries have made their nuclear-capable ballistic missiles ready for prompt use. Western intelligence agencies also have noticed an above-average level of activity at nuclear installations in both countries, but analysts said that could be the result of efforts to redeploy and safeguard weapons, which are believed to be stored unassembled during peacetime.

"The danger is not that either side intends to use nuclear weapons, but that a miscalculation could occur that leads to their release," said Joseph Cirincione, the director of the nonproliferation project at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. "We may be in a situation where nuclear warheads are being assembled and moved. That raises the possibility of an accident. If that happened, would the country that experienced the accident know what happened? Might they interpret it as a strike and retaliate?"

Officials in both countries dismiss chances of an accidental launch, saying they have taken multiple safety precautions. But several nuclear experts said they are not convinced those measures will work.

"India has not fought a full-scale war with a nuclear-armed Pakistan before," said Praful Bidwai, co-author of a book titled "South Asia on a Short Fuse."

"Given the history of these two nations, any conflict can easily get out of control," he said. "People who think we don't need to worry about nuclear weapons are living in denial."

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Suspicious Canisters Found Empty

By Dave Moniz, USA Today

WASHINGTON — U.S. forces discovered canisters in Afghanistan that they feared might be weapons of mass destruction or the ingredients for such weapons, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld said Wednesday.

But once the ominous-looking containers were opened, it was discovered they were empty, officials at U.S. Central Command in Tampa said.

Even so, the discovery of the canisters — which had skull and crossbones markings as well as Russian writing warning that they contained nuclear materials — renewed concerns that Osama bin Laden's al-Qaeda terrorist network or the Taliban that previously ruled Afghanistan had made or purchased weapons of mass destruction. Rumsfeld said that intercepted communications and confiscated plans show that al-Qaeda leaders have "an appetite" for weapons of mass destruction.

Pentagon officials said the canisters were discovered near the capital of Afghanistan, Kabul, by a British engineering firm that was clearing land mines. They did not say when they were found.

In other news Wednesday:

Rumsfeld said that he is uncertain of al-Qaeda leader bin Laden's whereabouts but still believes it's likely that both bin Laden and Taliban leader Mohammed Omar are in Afghanistan.

The United Nations Security Council imposed sanctions against bin Laden, al-Qaeda and remnants of the Taliban. The resolution, unanimously approved, requires all countries to impose an arms embargo and a ban on travel for individuals and groups associated with them. It also freezes their financial assets.

The resolution says bin Laden and al-Qaeda are continuing to support international terrorism and expresses the council's "determination to root out this network." The United States had strongly backed the resolution.

A man who claimed to have given money to the Taliban turned himself in voluntarily at the U.S. base in Kandahar and was questioned by American authorities. U.S. officials in Afghanistan said the man was at the base but was not a prisoner.

In Kandahar, the remains of the last of seven Marines killed in a plane crash last week were loaded on a transport plane to be flown to Germany and then to the USA.

Contributing: Wire reports

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Inside The Pentagon

January 17, 2002

Pg. 1

Rumsfeld Envisions New Command Responsible For Homeland Security

Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld has decided to create a brand new command responsible for defending the U.S. "homeland" from attack, defense officials tell Inside the Pentagon. Details on the recommendation are still being worked at the Pentagon, and ultimately will be subject to President Bush's approval. Senior officials hope to have an announcement ready by the president's Jan. 29 State of the Union address.

The contentious issue of how best to guard the nation is one of several items found in the new Unified Command Plan, a classified document largely completed by the Pentagon. The plan outlines the responsibilities for each of the nine unified combatant commands and is reviewed every two years.

Rumsfeld's homeland defense proposal broadly embraces the advice offered in a secret letter signed by each member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff last September, shortly after the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, according to defense officials. The new military-led organization, once fully established, would constitute an expansion to 10 unified commands -- the first such major change in the UCP since U.S. Joint Forces Command took over and expanded on Atlantic Command's responsibilities in October 1999.

Since endorsing the so-called "24-star letter" -- reflecting the six members of the Joint Chiefs who each wear four stars -- some service chief positions on building a new homeland security command have evolved to reflect unique concerns.

The Army, for example, over the past few months grew to favor naming Joint Forces Command the lead for homeland security, believing it would offer the best integration of land, sea and air assets. But the other services criticized that approach, saying the Norfolk, VA-based command would be distracted by its other existing missions, which include operational responsibility for the Atlantic region and combat experimentation across the services (ITP, Dec. 6, 2001, p1).

For its part, the Air Force increasingly lobbied for the North American Aerospace Defense Command -- with its vast array of satellites, radars and command and control technology -- to play a leading role. Since Sept. 11, the command -- dubbed NORAD -- has worked with the Federal Aviation Administration in monitoring potential air threats. And the command has overseen the combat air patrols over Washington, New York and other U.S. cities from its Colorado Springs, CO, headquarters. But critics note the command's experience does not extend to threats the United States may face from land or sea.

While both commands currently take a limited role in homeland defense, no single organization has overarching responsibility -- a problem the Pentagon's civilian and military leadership have agreed to rectify following the September terrorist attacks, ITP was the first to report (ITP, Sept. 20, 2001, p1).

Over the past few weeks, the Joint Chiefs reached a consensus of sorts on the issue, defense officials say. But in their most recent "tank" discussion on establishing a homeland security command, the four-stars reportedly presented less of a unified position on exactly how the mission should be organized than their earlier letter suggested.

It took Rumsfeld to settle the differences, according to defense officials. The result will be a derivative approach initially, drawing off of existing capabilities from different commands. But eventually a brand new unified command with primary responsibility for homeland security will be created, the Rumsfeld plan is reported to state. It will also create a new slot for a four-star general or flag officer.

The current nine unified combatant commands comprise five with regional responsibilities plus four others with solely "functional" missions like space or transportation.

Defense officials anticipate NORAD would be subsumed by the evolving new command, and some say NORAD's chief, Gen. Ed Eberhart, may be at its helm. But as the head of NORAD, Eberhart is already "dual-hatted" with responsibility for U.S. Space Command, which could weaken his focus on homeland security.

Another variant of the plan envisions a separate four-star being named to head the homeland security command from the outset, but his relationship to the existing NORAD chief would have to be worked out, defense sources said.

While warfighting commanders-in-chief support one another in various missions, none is viewed as permanently subordinate to another in the command chain.

Officials say various names for the new command have been kicked around. Many refer to the notional organization as the "Homeland Defense Command" or "Homeland Security Command," but there is also some talk of a "Northern Command."

The latter moniker would stand as a corollary of sorts to U.S. Southern Command, whose primary mission is counternarcotics in the Caribbean and Latin America. A Northern Command ostensibly would take regional responsibility for the United States and Canada -- which reflects the leadership role the two nations already share at NORAD, created during the Cold War to stand watch for possible attacks over the North Pole by the Soviet Union. Officials believe the new organization, whatever its name, will also subsume Joint Forces Command's homeland defense responsibilities. Currently that command has operational control over more than 80 percent of air, ground and naval forces based in the United States. JFCOM also directs a Joint Task Force for Civil Support (in response to incidents involving weapons of mass destruction), and the command recently established a "homeland security directorate" headed by an Army two-star general.

Also under consideration is giving the new homeland security command responsibility over the nation's West Coast, which is now under the operational jurisdiction of U.S. Pacific Command.

Further down the road, it is possible U.S. Southern Command's responsibilities would be folded into the new command as well. There has been some discussion of creating an "Americas Command" with this broader portfolio, officials say.

The headquarters location for the new command additionally remains in question. Many officials believe it should have a significant presence in Washington to facilitate interagency work, under the oversight the Cabinet-level homeland security director.

Rumsfeld was earlier expected to brief Bush Jan. 11 on this and other issues in the new Unified Command Plan, but is still working out details and had not yet briefed the president by press time (Jan. 16).

-- *Elaine M. Grossman*

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Washington Post
January 17, 2002
Pg. 11

U.S.-Russia Nuclear Talks Seek Pacts For Bush Trip

By Walter Pincus, Washington Post Staff Writer

U.S. and Russian defense officials said yesterday after two days of meetings that they would work toward reaching agreements on nuclear arms reductions in time for President Bush's visit to Moscow now planned for May or June. But major differences emerged over whether they would produce a legal document detailing the proposed cuts as well as calling for the destruction of warheads removed from missiles taken out of service.

Russia's first deputy chief of staff, Col. Gen. Yuri Baluyevsky, told reporters at the Pentagon that he wants "a legally binding document" on the two issues that would be signed by Bush and Russian President Vladimir Putin in Moscow.

Asked about whether the agreed-upon reductions in nuclear warheads should be accompanied by the destruction of warheads that are no longer on missiles, Baluyevsky said, "Warheads . . . dismantled from the carriers should be destroyed and eliminated."

The Russian position posed a potential major stumbling block to efforts by Moscow and Washington to reduce their strategic nuclear arsenals. Bush and Putin pledged at their meeting in the United States last year to reduce the warhead level to about 2,000 on each side. But the Pentagon has said since that it would not destroy the warheads of dismantled weapons but would instead place them in a reserve.

Defense Undersecretary Douglas Feith, while saying there will be more meetings to bring the two sides' views closer together, would not commit himself to any specific agreements in time for the Moscow meeting.

"If we can achieve agreement, then we will be pleased to record that agreement. We will decide on what the appropriate form for that is, depending on what it is we agree to," he said.

Feith emphasized that the Bush administration wants to leave behind the Cold War-era approach to arms control under which the verification of agreements was codified in treaties. He said it wants to replace this with information exchanges and cooperative activities between the two countries.

Feith noted that arms reduction treaties reached during the Cold War were "praised enthusiastically for having reduced nuclear arms" but that none called for the destruction of the warheads. "People are now focused on a new issue," he said, "and they're criticizing the reductions we are talking about."

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Washington Times
January 17, 2002
Pg. 17

Russian Parliament Hits U.S. Pullout From Treaty

MOSCOW — The lower house of Russia's parliament yesterday condemned the U.S. withdrawal from the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty and urged President Vladimir Putin to consult lawmakers on Moscow's response. The State Duma voted 326-3 for a nonbinding resolution assailing last month's decision by President Bush to withdraw from the ABM treaty in six months to deploy a national missile defense.

The U.S. move was "mistaken and destabilizing since it effectively ruins the existing highly efficient system of ensuring strategic stability and paves ground for a new round of the arms race," the resolution said.

The vote came as a Russian military delegation was holding talks in Washington with Pentagon officials on cooperation in fighting terrorism, a new military relationship and arms cuts to pave the way for Mr. Bush's trip to Russia in late May or early June.

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Moscow Times
January 17, 2002
Pg. 4

Pressure On Iraq

MOSCOW (Reuters) -- Moscow will try to pressure Baghdad into allowing UN weapons inspectors to return to Iraq when Iraqi Deputy Prime Minister Tariq Aziz visits Moscow later this month, Interfax reported Wednesday. The agency quoted sources in the Foreign Ministry as saying Aziz was due to arrive in Moscow after Jan. 20 for talks on easing international sanctions on Iraq in exchange for Baghdad's cooperation with the United Nations. Both the Foreign Ministry and the Iraqi Embassy in Moscow declined to comment on the report.

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Washington Post
January 17, 2002
Pg. 23

Nuclear Underachievers

By Richard Sokolsky

President Bush promised fundamental and long-overdue changes in the antiquated nuclear strategy he inherited from the Clinton administration. The Bush administration recently unveiled the results of its review of the U.S. nuclear posture. They are generally disappointing: The review does not deliver on the fundamental changes that were promised, and it is still overly influenced by the requirement to maintain the capability for large-scale attacks against Russia, despite the new relationship with Moscow the administration is building. While the review takes some steps in the right direction, it commits the United States over the next decade to maintaining far more nuclear weapons than are either necessary or desirable.

At the outset of his administration, the president offered a forward-looking vision of the future U.S. nuclear posture. He rejected the Cold War doctrine of mutual assured destruction, which required targeting Russia with thousands of nuclear weapons, and he pledged to rethink the requirements of nuclear deterrence in a new security environment. With Russia no longer our enemy to dictate the size of our nuclear arsenal, he held out the promise of profound changes in its size and structure. His commitment to a break from the past was a welcome change from the timid nuclear policies of the previous decade.

The president's decision to unilaterally reduce U.S. strategic force levels from 6,000 to about 1,700 to 2,200 operationally deployed warheads broke the gridlock in the strategic arms process, accomplishing in one bold stroke what years of arms control negotiations had failed to deliver.

But the strategic arms reductions announced by the administration are less sweeping than they appear. The force levels envisioned at the end of this decade are virtually the same as those agreed to by Bill Clinton and Boris Yeltsin in 1997, which were criticized by many observers as too timid.

Moreover, only minimal changes are contemplated in the composition of U.S. strategic forces. In fact, at the end of this decade the mix of strategic missiles, bombers and submarines that make up the U.S. nuclear "Triad" will not differ significantly from the force structure established by the Clinton administration's nuclear posture review -- a conservative document that broke little new ground.

Additionally, the Bush administration, like its predecessor, has no plans to destroy warheads removed from strategic systems or to eliminate the capacity of these platforms to be rapidly re-fitted with these reserve warheads. This "reconstitution" capability of more than 6,000 warheads is comparable to that planned by the Clinton administration. It is hard to imagine a plausible contingency, if Russia is no longer our enemy, that requires this kind of capability. It's also hard to reconcile this new nuclear force posture with the administration's rhetoric about a completely new relationship of cooperation with Russia. To give substance to its commitment to transform U.S. strategic policy and establish this partnership with Russia, the administration should drastically overhaul the current U.S. nuclear war-fighting plan, which is heavily driven by the Cold War requirement for massive nuclear attacks against Russia. In

taking this step, President Bush would be helping Russian President Vladimir Putin defend his pro-American policy from domestic hawks, who have strongly criticized the Bush nuclear posture review as "paper" disarmament. One positive feature of the nuclear review is its shift in planning from a threat-based approach, which sized and structured strategic forces to deal with the Soviet Union, to a capabilities-based approach, which relies on a broader mix of nuclear and non-nuclear forces to respond to a broader range of circumstances. In theory, this shift in emphasis could be significant if it leads to less dependence on nuclear weapons. But whether it does so remains to be seen.

Administration officials have said this new standard for sizing the nuclear posture takes into account multiple potential opponents over the next decade. But it is difficult to see how these possible opponents, projected by U.S. intelligence to have a total of fewer than 200 nuclear weapons over the next decade, justify U.S. retention of 1,700 to 2,200 operationally deployed warheads and the much larger force being held in reserve.

It is even more difficult to justify the nuclear posture review's force levels if one takes into account, as the authors profess to have done, U.S. plans to build anti-missile defenses and develop non-nuclear strike forces, such as those used in the Balkans and Afghanistan, to perform missions currently assigned to nuclear weapons.

We need a completely different yardstick for determining the size and capabilities of U.S. strategic nuclear forces. With the need to maintain an ensured retaliatory capability against no more than a few hundred targets anywhere in the world, the United States should be able to reduce its strategic warhead levels to well below 1,700 and eliminate the excessively larger reserve force it plans to maintain as a "hedge" against a resurgent Russia.

The writer is a visiting senior fellow at the National Defense University's Institute for National Strategic Studies.

The views expressed here are his own.

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Inside The Pentagon

January 17, 2002

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Five New WMD Teams Certified

The Defense Department has certified five new emergency response teams specializing in unconventional weapons. Four of the Weapons of Mass Destruction Civil Support Teams will be based in Phoenix, AZ, Boise, ID, Louisville, KY, and Eastover, SC.

"These teams are fully ready to assist civil authorities [responding] to a domestic weapon of mass destruction incident, and possess the requisite skills, training and equipment to be proficient in all mission requirements," a recent announcement states.

In another notice, dated Jan. 15, DOD said it has certified a WMD-CST from the Maine National Guard, which will be stationed in Waterville, ME.

Congress has authorized 32 of the teams, including 17 teams authorized in the fiscal year 2000 Defense Appropriations Act, and 10 teams authorized in FY-99 that have already been certified. Seven of the 17 teams authorized in FY-00 are now certified; five more teams authorized in FY-01 are being organized.

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Thursday January 17 10:55 AM ET

Senate Building Reopening on Hold

By NANCY BENAC, Associated Press Writer

WASHINGTON (AP) - Plans to reopen the Hart Senate Office Building, closed for three months due to anthrax contamination, were put on hold Thursday after a bag of gear used in the cleanup was found above a ceiling in the building.

Preliminary tests on the equipment revealed no evidence of the deadly bacteria, Capitol Police said. They said that as a precaution, work on preparing the Hart building for its reopening was suspended until final results are available, perhaps Friday, and 25 workers and emergency responders who were near the gear have been prescribed antibiotics. In addition, several basement rooms in the adjoining Dirksen Senate Office Building have been closed until definitive test results are available. These rooms, temporarily used as offices by senators displaced from the Hart building, share a ventilation system with rooms in Hart where the potentially exposed workers had been taken. The gear, contained in a bag, included gloves and protective suits, said Capitol Police spokesman Lt. Dan Nichols. The equipment was found in a hallway ceiling outside the sixth-floor Hart suite of Senate Majority Leader Tom Daschle, D-S.D.

“We're trying to determine how and why this was placed above the ceiling tiles,” Nichols said.

Nichols said the building's scheduled reopening for noon Friday is now unlikely. The nine-story structure holds offices of half the 100 senators.

The delay was the latest that has plagued efforts to reopen the Hart building, which has been shuttered since Oct. 17. That was two days after a letter to Daschle was opened that contained an estimated billions of spores of anthrax and a threatening note.

Daschle's letter was among several containing the bacteria that were delivered last fall. Ultimately, anthrax was detected in dozens of locations around Washington, New York and elsewhere, causing five fatalities and a national focus on bioterrorism.

In the initial days after the Daschle letter was opened, officials said the million-square-foot Hart building could be decontaminated and reoccupied by mid-November. It took three attempts at cleaning the building with poisonous chlorine dioxide gas and other techniques before it was finally declared “clean and safe” on Thursday by officials from the Environmental Protection Agency ([news - web sites](#)), the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention ([news - web sites](#)) and other agencies.

Maintenance crews had begun cleaning the building Wednesday in preparation for its reopening.

http://dailynews.yahoo.com/h/ap/20020117/pl/anthrax_congress_9.html

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